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A.   Introduction
There are two major approaches in option pricing which will be referenced in the follo-
wing paper: One approach analyzes the past and tries to project from into the future.
The other one proceeds from mathematical
2 financial market models like the models
based on the Brownian Motion or more generally on kinetic processess described by
the Wiener processes mathematically.
 Both beginnings try to describe and above all predict also far refined corollary as-
sumptions and techniques the real movements of the financial markets.
A general evaluation model is presented, which - ex post - allows a comprehensive
evaluation of verious options and the examination of evaluation models.
Some samples analyzed during 1998 may be still of interest: Figure 11: SFR-Options,
Strike 1,23 DEM e.g. is a rare sample where the course crosses four times the line of
the strike price. The results of analyzing fictitious options (Figure 7: Evaluation errors
of 469 Options (1998 until 9/1997)) is valid at all times
3. Test datas are sent gladly by
email: gschroeder@foni.net.
B.   Suggested Model Systematics
The most important rules are discussed and used for the construction of fictitious reali-
stic courses like they can be observed in reality. The Stochastic Volatility (SV) seems
to be an important rule to ensure realistic formats. A sparing use of MR
4 allows to ge-
nerate precisely a volatility intended.
B.  I.   The Brownian Motion as a Model Blueprint
Professional microscopes allow to observe the Brownian Motion. The surrounding
molecules of the liquid preparing a particle for examinations under the microscope
move in random directions and are knocking the pollen grain in random directions.
Since it is uniformly surrounded by this bombardment, the effects tend to neutralize
over time. The idea is that stock orders create similar impulses regarding the course
5
being the equivalent to the particle however in an one dimensional process
6 over time
while the original Brownian motion is two dimensional.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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Financial markets processes with special timing and phases for order gathering and
course fixing are different - not to mention special rules for opening and closing. The
order size varies
7 and doesn’t correspond to the homogenuous molecules of the pre-
paration liquid.
The Brownian motion allows jump processes also within the range of the lognormal
distribution that can be proven for this cinetic phenomenon. However, in case of finan-
cial markets jumps are probably reactions to news and exogene foundet respectively.
Actual courses thus are better represented by leptocurtic courses than by the lognor-
mal distribution.
To describe the „laws“ of financial markets in theoretical modell it requires obviously
stochastic subprocesses with the SV processes beeing the most important ones in
controlling the volatility and the bandwidth.
B.  II.  Suggested Systematics of advanced Capital Market Models
To cover all known properties a model should include the following stochastic proper-
ties:
Figure 1 : Model Sytematics
B&S Base Distribution Process lognormal, exp.-hyperbolical,
historical or any other
Subprocesses:
Stochastic excessive Clustering
Volatility Volatility   Mean Reversion Non MR   
non excessive Volatiliy within Mean Range
Jump Diffusion Conformity Non Conformity
Stalagmites Formats „White Noise“ Sign
Parameters or Subprocesses Bias
B&S Interest Rates Could be as complex as to Volatility Effects
Bandwidth stochastic limit, related to Volatility or not
Drift / Trend Only linear trends make sense
Saisonal Effects as a yearly, monthly, weekly pattern
Trading Rules Rules covering the price fixing process
stock exchange rules and index definitions
The Black and Scholes Model (B&S) covers the base process and interest rates only.
This may explain the limited power in representing real markets.
SV, Clustering and Jump Processes are important model contributions and could be
considered as ‘overtones’. Jump subprocesses have a smoothing effect, while during
Stalagmite phases returns above normal can be observed. Both refer primarely to the
underlying process.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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They are subject of the advanced models yet until today there is no mathematical mo-
del able to handle all these phenomena in common. The implementation of two or
three rules already causes quite some mathematical complexity. To avoid unrealsistic
courses a bandwidth control based also on the volatility and reflecting trends (drifts) in
case of indices should be included.
This is a chance for experimental research to test and optimize a model concept even
befor a mathematical formula is available.
B.  III.   Stochatics of Model Properties
Except the volatility per centages all other figures indicate how many weeks out of 52
weeks relate to the particular effect. Except the non-excess figures all other figures are
not exclusive. I. e. a bandwidth violation would very probably coincide with a jump etc.
Figure 2: Profile of Subprocesses
Jump Double MR Clustering Bandwidth Non Excess Average
Definition  > 2,8% Jump > 0,25% < 0,25% Xt-26 +hVol 2,00% Volatility
USD 1,4 0,35 1,8 4,5 6,7 10,1 10,1%
DOW 3,4 1,65 2,1 4,2 5,9 8,7 14,5%
NIKKEI 4,3 2,17 2,8 4,8 6,3 6,2 15,7%
DAX 4,8 2,25 2,5 4,2 6,9 7,8 15,8%
NASDAQ 2,5 1,38 2,1 2,3 4,5 5,0 16,4%
C.   Test Methodology
By experimental economic research is meant in addition to stochastic analysis the in-
troduction of fictitious options and cloning of artificial financial values. All derived va-
lues such as volatility, evaluation results, exercise results etc. are computed in a rolling
procedure during the entire period from 1988 to 1997. The last values in 1997 change
thereby because of the missing advance gradually from actual, ex post determined
values into historical values.
C.  I.   Introduction of fictitious Options
C. I. along historical (weekly) quotations fictitious options are emitted, which have the
respective spot as basis (thus "at the money"). These options are exercised when ex-
piring and the present value of the results determined. Interest rate and running time
can be varied.
For calls (puts) "in the money" the proportional deviation of the option basis from the
spot can be set to - 5% (+ 5%). ("out the money" in reverse: with + 5% (- 5%)). With
the comparison with actual options, each demanded moneyness in per cent can be
entered by the course. As evaluation result and yardstick for the comparison the aver-
age value of practice proceeds from approximately 500 options (including the unsuc-
cessful) was specified. The hit rate was indicated at the same time. The means of
proceeds is called empirical value in the future.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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The model of Black and Scholes, presupposing options of European type was ex-
amined according to "European" rules . It becomes however with the option examples
in section 0 ignored that the theoretical models suffer partially very restrictive accep-
tance, which would partly forbid application to shares, indices, rate of exchange etc. or
option types (American or European) (e. g. "fair value"
8). It can be agreed upon to rate
only the cases as hits with those the change of course a threshold value, about one
per cent, exceeds.
C.  II.  Test of Evaluation Methods
To test a hypothesis, that a given distribution fits into a normal distribution in general
techniques like the X2-Test can be used. Then the potential range of an underlying is
split into classes and their frequencies compared with correspondent classes e. g. of
lognormal function. A test value is computed allowing a statement that hypothesis that
a distribution can or cannot be considered lognormal on a level of confidence set to
0,1, 0,05 or 0,01 typically. This type of test can be used to eliminate different aproxi-
mations. However, ist doesn’t contribute to option pricing for two reasons:
1.  The classes have to be designed in a way that the frequencies do not fall below 5. This
would mean to have large ranges for  classes for the exerior flanks of the distribution
that on the other side contain the most profitable cases to evaluate the options.
2.  The key question is: What impact does a particular distribution have on the related op-
tion prices?
It’s a matter of taste to say both distributions are different or remarkably close. In terms
of option pricing they differ significantly:
The value of fictitious options emitted weekly are determined  here using the formula of
Black and Scholes. Then they are compared with results of all 500 options when exer-
cised. The volatility was determined ex post over 13 weeks and scaled on one year
 9.
Some real options used in addition as comparison are American type. Practically they
are exercised rarely. Usually all observed options - even if "deeply in the money" -
show courses slightly higher than their theoretical exercise results.
Different interest rates can be taken to determine the present value when exercised
and for the respective method, in order to be able to differentiate between interest ra-
tes without risk and others. The interest rate was selected in such a way - without con-
sideration of the modelltheorischen defaults - that in case of deviations a minimum
was obtained. Thus resulted, 6 per cent "interest without risk" in the case of DAX and
DOW as well as 3 per cent in the case of fictitious dollar rate of exchange options, 4.5
per cent in the case of the log-normal distributions. With actual currency options with
zero per cent the best approximation was obtained.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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One could object, that a quotation beeing a parameter of most of the known option
pricing models
10, undergoes reasonnable changes and in case of indexes like DJ and
DAX follows a a trend over a period of several years. However, these effects are taken
into account by comparing them synchronuously. In section „Comparison: Underlying
vs Option Chances“ a possibility standardize options will be suggested (100 units, 1
DEM, Points etc.).
C.  III.   Measurement of Autocorrelation Frequencies
By extensive computing the coerrelation between a x-week period of quotation and
evrey other x-week period will be measured and the number of cases counted if the
coerrelation exceeds a given limit - e.g. 0,949.
The first set of the rolling starts at week 1 and moves forward through the complete
sample of 500 weeks in this case until the last week minus x. In a corresponding row
the number of hits will be saved
11.
C.  IV.   Measurements of Distribution Differences
To measure the phenomenon of deviating real quotations with respect to ideal type as-
sumed mathematical distributions in statistics Curtosis
12 , Skewness as well as Chi-
Square-Tests are offered. However, the context of these analysis rather suggests to
use the pricing quality itself as a comparison method and either accept evaluation dif-
ferences or disapprove them. The lognormal distribution (black) in Figure 3
corresponds with the dis-
tribution of weekly Dollar
exchangerates (white) as
far as they were compu-
ted using 26 weeks
(7,1% / Squareroot(2).
The symmetric normal
distribution ( ) shows
light right oriented
srewness of the
lognomal distribution (dark bold line). Multiplieing the probailities with the present va-
lues of  individual exercise returns of the sample above (Options with a exercise price
1,75 DEM shows the leverage effect:
While the deviation seems to be rather marginal wenn looking at Figure 3  the effect
on option pricing ist significant: Comparing the normal and lognormaler distribution a
9 per cent under-(10 per cent over-)-evaluationv of calls (puts) can be observed. The
deviation between the historical and the lognormal distribution in the sample is an ove-
Figure 3: Evaluation Effects of DistributionsEmpirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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revalution of calls arround 10 per cent % and an unerevaluation of puts around 3 per
cent.
Figure 4: Comparisons of Distributions via the Price
Distribution Calls Puts    Hits         w/o Curt- Skrew- cross correlation
26 Weeks Euro Euro Calls Puts Return osis ness t. ln. n.
historical 3,45 3,22   40     37     23 7,24 2,38 1 0,78 0,85
lognormal 3,79 3,12   46     42     12 -1,32 0,49 1 0,93
 normal 3,45 3,45   44     44     12 -1,35 0,52 1
The significant peak around the mid point (curtosis) of the historical Dollar distributiom
results in lower returns on the left side lowering put prices consequently.
The skewness supports higher call prices. For option pricing both terms are not pro-
ductive.
The hypothesis, the Dollar distribution would be lognormal verteilt, is not supported by
a Chi-square test at a significance niveau of α = 0,1.
Dollar returns and lognormal correlate positive with a coefficient  r = 0,78. However,  it
is suggested to speak of strong ("stramm") correlation only if r > 0,95.
C.  V.  Fictitious Courses with a given Distribution
A course over period of  520 weeks (in one case 52 weeks) is to be generated. It is
done by drawing randomly and applieing returns of perfectly generated lognormal re-
turn numbers. The fictituous course starts with its mean which might be an actual
course.
It was also made certain that on 10 years the log-normal distribution counted was not
changed by further 13 quotations needed for the advance. For realistic prognosis one
would use more plausible distributions - for instance the own distribution of returns of a
quotation over the last years, corrected by specific trends.
D.   Empirical Results Part 1
Fictitious options permit a more comprehensive analysis of evaluation beginnings, than
it would be possible with Optionssamples.
D.  I.   Fictituous Dollar Options
Figure 5 shows, how the fair value stands after Black and Scholes (lines within the
range of 0 to 6 DM) in relation to individual practice proceeds and to their average va-
lue. The deviation between the average value of all "fair values" to that of practice
proceeds is selected as yardstick for the correctness of an evaluation method waiting
for comparisonEmpirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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Figure 5: Fictitious Options - Dollar
The phenomenon of positive average yields (or trends of the Underlying) is considered
in the model by Black and Scholes only in the context of the log-normal distribution.
The middle "fair value" for calls, (black line, puts grey) amounts to here 5.70 DM (3.30
DM), that from proceeds (strongly deflecting lines) 5.35 DM (5.42 DM). There are pha-
ses of up to one and a half years, in which with dollar calls or puts (nearly) no practice
proceeds could be obtained, while the fair values vary also in these periods only
slightly around their average value.
D.  II.  Fictitious DAX Options
With DAX options the same notes are to be made as for the formation of means i.e. of
the expectancy value. However the average yield of many years DAX of over 11 per
cent causes an increase of the hits with calls (69% to 31%). The "fair values" unde-
restimate calls (-43%) and overestimate puts (+29%). (to further measurements s. tab.
2).
Volatilitypeaks (maxima of the „Fair-Value“-Curves (e. g. July 1990, volatility at 30%),
show rather the change of call- and put chances instead of their actual chances. Du-
ring mid of 89 until beginning of 91 the volatility approaches a niveau of 22% (Ø =
15%). This period includes profitable DAX-Puts in the mid range only, howe-
ver,worthless DAX calls in the same time.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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Figure 6: Fictive Optionen - DAX
The increasing call returns during Dec. 96 are a consequence of the increasing DAX-
returns. The volatility here is beyong mean. (See paragraph „Comparison: Underlying
vs Option Chances, page 15 “) also. Put returns can be observerd in 1990 (1.-3.
Quarter), 1991 (3. Q.) 1992 and 1994. The maximum returns of calls around June
1993 is not reflected by the volatility reflektiert (here max 15% = ∅).
D.  III.   Examinations at quoted Options (DAX, USD, SRF)
Four options analyzed from expenditure to practice with running times of ½ year
(DAX), 1 and 2 years (USD) as well as 2½ years (SFR)
 13.
The following DAX option corresponds to the fictitious DAX options (above) in the run-
ning time. The DAX course was illustrated without scale.
Call prices are first closely at the "fair values" like empirical values. In the last four
months however overestimation increases with the prices as constant at the "fair va-
lues". The put prices are close to the "fair values" until two months before maturity ex-
ceeding them and the "empirical values" in accordance with section C.  I. .
(continued page 10 following the next table)Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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Figure 7: Evaluation errors of 469 Options (1998 until 9/1997)
Errors B-S I'rate Volatility Wochen Moneyness Calls Puts
USD 3% Ø 9,6% 13 in 9% -16%
Hits 26 in 12% -25%
- 5% 75 : 25 13 at -1% -34%
  0% 49 : 51 26 at 7% -39%
+5% 23 : 77 13 out -21% -47%
26 out -7% -53%
Ln(usd 1,5%) 3% Ø 6,8% 13 in 7% -25%
Hits 26 in -4% -38%
- 5% 79 : 21 13 at -16% -55%
  0% 51 : 49 (see upper curve 26 am -13% -61%
+5% 26 : 74  page 13 13 aus -85% -78%
26 out -49% -53%
DAX 4.5% Ø 15,3% 13 in -22% 33%
Hits 26 in -35% 47%
- 5% 86 : 14 13 at -29% 35%
  0% 73 : 27 26 at -43% 29%
+5% 55 : 45 13 out -34% 20%
26 out -48% 5%
Ln(dax 3%) 3% Ø 14,3% 13 in -13% -16%
Hits 26 in -21% -25%
- 5% 65 : 35 13 at -29% -29%
  0% 50 : 50 (see page 8) 26 at -35% -40%
+5% 35 : 65 13 out -51% -45%
26 out -49% -53%
DOW 4,5% Ø 12,1% 13 in -27% 79%
Hits 26 in -38% 174%
- 5% 96 : 4 13 at -37% 156%
  0% 82 : 18 26 at -47% 278%
+5% 50 : 50 13 out -40% 167%
26 out -54% 411%
NASDAQ 4,5% Ø 12,5% 13 in -5% -13%
Hits 26 in -11% -12%
- 5% 70 : 30 13 at -12% -25%
  0% 56 : 44 26 at -19% -19%
+5% 40 : 60 13 out -20% -38%
26 out -28% -25%
NIKKEI 95-97 4,5% Ø 16,6% 13 in -31% 40%
Hits 26 in -40% 83%
- 5% 87 : 13 100 Weeks 13 at -45% 31%
  0% 73 : 27 only 26 at -50% 74%
+5% 54 : 46 13 out -58% 3%
26 out -59% 58%Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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The white lines "practice" for calls and puts represent the expectancy value after
proceeds ex post according to the method represented in section „Test of Evaluation
Methods“ . The times between the measuring points on Weeks became rounded. It
concerns thus empirical values, which would have resulted for options with same pro-
perties in the last 10 years. The changed moneyness was again adjusted thereby for
each time. In the months April/May such as July/August. 1996 follows the put prices for
instance the line of the fair values only around 30 to 40 DPf more highly. That could be
because of the use superelevated implicit Volatilitaetswerte with the purchase decisi-
ons. Starting from September prices and fair ones of values of the calls lie however
closely together continuous over the empirical values. The Volatility nearly constantly
rose in 1996 up to 7,4. puts are starting from October from the money.
Figure 8: DAX-Options, Strike 2500
Call- as well as put prices of the following Dollar option exceed the fair values mot
of the time.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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Figure 9: Dollar Options, Strike 1,50 DEM
The approximation of the evaluation after Black and Scholes, however with the interest
rate 0%, is relatively successful. The Volatility was determined ex post, as 13-week
volatilities were converted with the factor square root(4) = 2 to year volatilities. For the
following illustration the volatility was smoothed by halving. The higher valuation in the
place 25 July based itself by that there ex post determined high value for the Volatility
(16% instead of average value 11%). Die Volatility wurde ex post festgestellt, indem
13-wöchige Volatilityen mit dem Faktor Wurzel(4)=2 auf Jahresvolatilityen umgerech-
net wurden.
The volatility in the following diagram is smoothed by halving. The higher valuation at
July 25 is a result of the high value for the Volatility measured ex post (16% instead of
average value 11%).
Figure 10: Dollar-Options, Strike 1,80 DEMEmpirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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The wrong value is related to the actual, current option prices. The Dollar rate reaches
nearly this height only later at the beginning of of 1998.
Figure 11: SFR-Options, Strike 1,23 DEM
The SFR puts register a high price increase in the first half of 1997 with 5 per cent on
December20. the coming increase seems to suggest 96 highly failing volatility (avera-
ge 3%). However, the evaluation that should result from it is not reached by the prices.
The volatility excess at the  Sept 19
th, 1997 lead to an easy rise of the false estimate
(line with lozenge). Around the turn of the year 97/98 the call prices develop optimisti-
cally again. The volatility was calculated here by two weeks base (otherwise 13
weeks). (the "Mispricing line": "◊" consists of call and PUT deviations.)
D.  IV.   Fictitious Courses with given Distributions
Fictitious courses for examining evaluation beginnings can be produced also for pro-
gnosis purposes with the help of given return distribution. To examine the formula of
Black and Scholes a log-normal distribution is computed, a corresponding DAX quota-
tion selected as starting point and oriented at the standard deviation of the DAX index
in the time of 1988 to 1997 (approx. 8%) and with 12 months rolling,Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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Figure 12: Artificially generated Courses (DAX-Type)
The log-normal indices cannot copy the DAX index from 87 to 97. While the DAX in
that quadruples itself the years from 1988 to 1997, log-normal courses reach 1.8 (2,5)-
fache increase during a standard distribution of 3 per cent (5 per cent) only.
A higher standard distribution would lead to unrealistic (not observed in 16 years) ex-
cursions. One of the following courses (type of dollar, white) is already lognormally di-
stributed over 52 weeks. One sees that with a reduced supply of only 52 this course
strews closely around a meant straight line accordingly.
The larger dollar movements (standard deviation 4%) of the past cannot be formatted
thereby. The evaluation error is here - with accepted interest from 0% to 5.9% for calls
(puts) with -30 to +14 per cent (-23% to -53%). In the most favorable case with log-
normally distributed course (type of dollar) with 13 Weeks time an applicable evaluati-
on was determined and with 26 weeks 12% (10%) overestimation with calls (Puts).
The error by rounding on integral frequency was with 1 per cent.
Although all artificial dollar rates were produced after a log-normal distribution with 1,5
per cent of standard deviation, its volatility lies with up to 7 per cent.
Figure 13: Artificially generated Courses (USD-Type)Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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Evaluations of different quotations (Figure Figure 3) of DAX“ and Dollar“-courses are
significat.
D.  V.  Actual Volatility DAX vs VDAX
End-of- Month-values [x] of the socalled Deutsche Volatilitysindex (VDAX), published by
the DTB, were compared with the real volatility computed ex post (solid line).
Figure 8 show the results of B-S evaluations but using the VDAX index (instead of real
values) compared with exercise results ex post. The values for exercised calls are
slightly lower, ending with 1,50 DEM,  than in figure 5, ending with 1,40. This is due to
a different time frame as the VDAX started in 1992. Figure Figure 9  relates to options
„at-the-money“:
Actual volatility quotes are compared Figure 14 with the German futures exchange
VDAX values ex post available since 1992. Values were converted for 13 weeks and
scaled to the year (square root(4)). Starting from 1994 the VDAX values are appro-
priate for values (15.3% to 13.6 %) on average over the values determined ex post.
Both data rows differ significantly, they don’t correlate (coeffizient r = -0,03, with -1 > r
< +1). Thus the implied volatility is rather casual indicating the real volatility and for op-
tion pricing of no use . The evaluation error on „hot“ days („Hexensabbat“, due dates)
ranges up to 30 per cent. The VDAX indicates rather a temporary overpricing than rele-
vant impact on future option values.
Figure 14: VDAX vs Ex post measured
Figure 15 resembles time and total numbers from Figure 14 compares the stronger
evaluation effect of actual volatility values and VDAX values with fictitious options. The
tendentious underestimation of DAX calls by Black and Scholes is weakened by the
higher VDAX values. Overestimation around DAX puts is strengthened.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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Figure 15: Pricing Errors
Time Weeks Volatility Basis = Calls Puts
88-96 13 real course + 10% -10% 26%
26 real course + 10% -41% 50%
13 real course -24% 44%
26 real course -38% 37%
13 real course - 10% -15% -18%
26 real course - 10% -26% -6%
92-95 13 real course -8% 21%
26 real course -38% 37%
13 VDAX course 0% 37%
26 VDAX course -15% 43%
For a better fit calls (puts) the real volatility ex post should be multiplied by  1,2 to re-
trieve equal evaluations according to the B-S-Model compared with results when exer-
cised.
For calls (puts) in-the-money the basis was assumed as - 10% (+ 10%) of the actual
course. (Out-of-the-money reverse)
Figure 16: VDAX vs Volatility ex post (Interest Rate 4,5%)
 B-S Errors VDAX DAX‘92-‘95 DAX‘88-‘97
Hits: Volatility: 15,3% 13,7% 15%
’92 - ‘95 Weeks Money- 1992-1996 1992-1996 1988-1997
 - 5% 85:15 ness Calls Puts Calls Puts Calls Puts
   0% 75:25 13 in -30% 66% -32% 58% -22% 33%
+5% 65:35 26 in -47% 115% -49% 100% -35% 47%
’88 - ‘97 13 at -37% 110% -43% 85% -29% 35%
 - 5% 90:10 26 at -55% 130% -60% 102% -43% 29%
   0% 70:30 13 out -43% 169% -54% 107% -34% 20%
+5% 45:55 26 out -63% 155% -69% 104% -48% 5%
D.  VI.   Comparison: Underlying vs Option Chances
To the comparison of option chances with different quotations the course volume on in
each case 100 points or DM was standardized. Thus the influence of the kurs-niveaus
and the reference relationship is neutralized. It concerns again Fictive options "at the
money" with 13 weeks time.
Maxima are emphasized in
the table. Based on actual
practice proceeds NASDAQ
calls (dollar puts) have -
ceteris paribus - the highest
value. The evaluation after
Black and Scholes, which
turns off to the volatility,
estimate DAX calls and puts most highly. With all calls and with dollar puts the evalua-
tion is after Black and Scholes under the expectancy value after proceeds. (here only
Figure 17: Price Comparison of norm. Underlying
in DEM I'rate Vola Method Calls Puts
Dollar 3% 9,6% B-S 2,30 1,57*
Dollar actual 2,40 2,29
DOW 4,5% 12,1% B-S 3,00 1,91
DOW actual 4,34 0,86
DAX 4,5% 15,3% B-S 3,63 2,53
DAX actual 5,23 1,77
NASDAQ 4,5% 12,5% B-S 3,09 1,99
NASDAQ actual 5,73 1,66Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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the "option propensity" concerns to a quotation without consideration of rate of ex-
change risks for DEM investors!)
D.  VII.   „Definition“ of the Dollar Exchange Rate
A model for the Dollar exchange rates can be defined in the following way:
A weekly USD-DEM exchange rate is generated when based on an approximated hy-
perbolic distribution returns are drawn randomly while applying the following rules:
1.  When the volatility is excessive those returnes are selected and applied for the fol-
lowing n1 weeks that ensure mean reversion.
2.  When the bandwidth is excessive those returnes are selected and applied for the
following n2 weeks that reduce the bandwidth best.
3.  The n3 weeks after an excessive return (jump) make a Poisson process.
The application of the rules is not determined strongly but rather „soft“ and controlled
randomly how often and how long they should be applied in a particular situation. The
rules require the following parameter:
Bandwidth, number of repetitive draws in case of excessivity, mean (expected value)
of volatility (being a measure of Bandwidth also), Factor for sign bias effects and dura-
tion parameters: For simplification  n1 = n2 = n3  can be assumed.
For tuning purposes the rules and parameters can be tried out with the history quota-
tions. In case of forecasting weekly seasonal effekts should be considered.
That’s a way to describe but also to create or clone a fictitious USD-DEM exchange
rates or important indexes. By increasing or decreasing positive returns (and negative
ones vice versa) hausse and baisse effecs can be enabled.
D.  VIII.   Experimental Approach - a Suggestion
To analyze the impact of volatility and performance on evaluation the original DAX in-
dex is suggested to transform the DAX into an index that developes „horizontal“ wi-
thout a positive performance. This cannot be achieved by just increasing the volatility
by a factor since this would leave the index quotations and thus the ealuations of exer-
cise results untouched.
•  Step 1: Adding a negative linear function by substracting 3,8 points per week.
•  Step 2: Smoothing the significantly increased Volatility by using 2 week means (gli-
ding means) of DAX quotations.
•  Step 3: By using 5 week means a volatility of 15,5% is achieved that is close to the
„natural“ or long term volatility of 16,1%.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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•  Step 4: By using 10 week means a volatility of 10,5% is achieved that is close to
the volatility of the Dollar exchange rate.
The approach hadn't be performed yet.
E.   Empirical Results Part 2
The dynamics of autocorrelation are analyzed with respect to GARCH beginnings.
E.  I.   Diskontinuität der Autokorrelation
With the DAX as with other indices and the dollar rate of exchange a phenomenon is
to be observed that the frequency of similar course sequences can rise at certain
times, on average once in the year, precipitously and then again to a low level drops
back. This effect leads in the following illustration to curve developments, which look
like "stalagmiteS".
The form supply of distance sections with 13 points achieves astronomical numbers
after the combinatorial mathematics. The numbers do not reduce noticeably, if all va-
riations became to go through. Turned around the observation of repetitions means a
characteristic only because of the practically unlimited form variety.
The number of similar 13 weeks periods is enough with the DAX to 60, with the DOW
and dollar rate of exchange to 40 times (DOW and dollar without fig.). In 55 per cent of
the cases are present to 3 repetitions with each the three quotations in 16 years: The
occurrence of more "strong" autocorrelation is to a considerable degree synchronous
with the DAX.
Figure 18: Autocorrelation DAX
The next two diagrams compare NASDAQ autocorrelation effects on a




on a 13 weeks and 62 days basis (both making aproximately a quarterof a year). The
discontinuity effect with both data types runs to a considerable degree synchronously
and runs on the same level over remarkable 120 repetitions. Autocorrelation steps up
with shorter distances, e. g. 8 weeks, as expected more frequently. The phenomenon
of the precipitous change remains. Only with sequences under 6 weeks the effect is
becoming diffuse.
E.  II.  White Noise
Using these criteria two clases of „temperature“ can be defined. Figure 20 shows
returns over 13 weeks in relation to periods of autoregression.
Periods with sequen-
ces over 13 weeks
without any repetioti-
on of formats can be
qualified as "white
noise".
Periods with intensive correlation are symbolized by "black". The last line contains
13-weeks-periods with formats that repeat more than 30 times within the sample..
Figure 20: 13 Weeks Returns following
Autocorrelation
DAX DAX DOW USD
Sample 87-97 81-7/97 81-7/97 81-7/97
Years 11 16,6 16,6 16,6
totalt 16% 14,5% 13,6% -0,1%
„white“ 13% 13% 12% -0,1%
„black“ 22% 15% 20% -0,1%
„>30 x“ 21% 17% 30% - /+5,0%Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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With DAX and DOW the repetitions incline with the rise of the returns, with the dollar
rate of exchange significant returns rises changes in both directions. (the dollar is not
subject also like the indices to a constant return expectation). The measured returns
depend - less than with DAX and DOW - on the coincidental choice of the time period.
The curves run with DAX (see illustration), DOW and dollar to a considerable degree
synchronously. "white (noise)" phases, which constitute two thirds of the observation
time of 81 to 97, point with the indices by (with the dollar rate of exchange by a middle)
a return below average over 13 weeks. (A paradoxon: The week returns of the black
periods are below average!)
„Black" periods can be interpreted in such a way that in them global relevant influences
on groups of quotations or the financial markets work altogether at the same time. In
"black" phases 13-week sequences with strong correlation on average repeat them-
selves nine times.
An increase of the Volatility approximately over the average value of 11 per cent is not
an indication for reaching a phase with high correlation. The average values of the vo-
latility levels from in each case all "white" and "black" sections are alike up to fractions
of per cent, while the individual values in both section vary from 5 to 24 per cent.
Figure 21: Autocorrelation DAX
Intensive correlation (black) vs lower correlation (white)
E.  III.   Volatility - Stochastic vs Implied
Studying SV has implications for the usage of implied but recent volatility as a predictor
for the future volatility. The only rational is based on the clustering effect. But this is not
a continuous effect. In 75 per cent of all cases the volatility related to week x+1 chan-
ges less than  0.25 per cent from the volatility in week x. During 210 weeks with ex-
cessive volatility (2.5% deviation from mean) MR happens in 47 weeks - in 20 weeks
the volatility is becoming more excessive. But excessive values suggest predictions
being too high.Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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The existence of SV disallows the application of the formula required to convert a daily
volatility into a yearly figure:
Vyear = Vday * SQUARE ROOT (1/365)      (1/252, ifn counting banking days only)   [X]
The equation requires a stable volatility!
14 Thus the daily or even hourly DAX volatility
computations are methodolically outrageous The volatility is an price indicator but not
predictor of a future development.
F.   Consequences and Hypthesis
Why the difference? One could think that the B-S-model doesn’t „recognize“ the long-
time performance which in case of the Dollar/DEM exchange rate is -1% (per year)
while it is for the DAX index +11,5% (DOW index 13,8%). However, the B-S-evaluation
doesn’t change significantly when e.g. the DAX-curve is turned down by adding a ne-
gative linear funktion with the performance lowering to zero. The reason for the diffe-
rent evaluation is the different standard deviation or volatility.
The Black-Scholes-Model has many deficiencies:
1.  The assumtion that courses are distributed lognormally cannot be proved for the
Dollar exchange rates and prominent indexes like the DOW, NASDAQ or DAX.
2.  The B-S-formula implies using the strike price instead of the most recent quotati-
on as the center of the distribution curve. Due to the logarithmic component of the
B-S-formula this position is the maximum of the distribution while empirical distri-
butions prove that the most recent course is the „best predictor of any future pri-
ce“, (Giddy I. H. / Dufey G. 1975).
3.  The B-S-formula is applicable for european type options. However, that doesn’t
hinder financial newspapers and investment bankers to apply the model on all ty-
pes of options. This explains the most important evaluation error. Less time to
maturity means not only a reduced present value but a much smaller spread of the
distribution and lower returns.
The Black-Scholes-results depend mainly on the volatility which has to be estimated
also. This is questionnable pe se. It is even more questionnable when the estimation is
done by using the reverse form of the Black and Scholes formula: the Volatility is re-
quested that could have led to the current prices. The VDAX Volatility quotations this is
done first for individual options that are merged while they are adjusted to cover diffe-
rent lead times, strike prices etc. These volatility figures can reach more than 30 Per
cent while real Volatility measured ex post did not exceed 18 % during 1992 til mid of
1996. It is to be demonstrated due to the empirical results, which restrictions of the
prognostic quality of the different models are to be madeEmpirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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F.  I.   Violation of assumed Lognormal Distribution
The underevaluation of puts by  „Fair Values“ in Figure 5: Fictitious Options - Dollar is
caused by the skewness of the lognormal distribution. However, even lognormal distri-
buted, artificially generated indexes are subject of erroneous evaluation according to
Black and Scholes.
A significant part of the literature over financial models is concerned with the idea (ho-
pe?), financial data and their returns could be attributed to the normal distribution, in
order to be able to develop prognoses to it. From mathematician Bachelier (1900) co-
mes one of the first contributions in this area. (the log-normal distribution is in this con-
nection a normal distribution of the relative-reciprocal returns: resembles frequency for
halving and duplication etc.)
That creates a statistic dilemma: The log-normal distribution for instance in the model
of Black and Scholes can be justified nor rejected alone theoretically for stock ex-
change courses neither compellingly. While no empirical vouchers for log-normal dis-
tribution are present, since beginning of the 80's increasingly were objections reported
(overviews with Galai, 1983, and Kolb, 1995/stone burner, 1996) that the acceptance
"log-normally" rarely (never?) apply. That often came already in the title to the expres-
sion: "Skewness, kurtosis and Black Scholes Mispricing (Geske, Touros, 1991) or"
failure of the Gaussian Hypothesis" (Peters, 1994). During the evaluation early theore-
tical models it should be considered that the data availability is not to be compared with
the today's possibilities. Vouchers also in this work for "deviations" can affirm but for all
conceivable quotations of the future not exclude only doubts.
There have been daubts from the beginning and also critics like: „Skewness, Kurtosis
and Black-Scholes Mispricing (Geske,Touros, 1991), or the „failure of the Gaussian
Hypothesis“ (E. E. Peters, 1994) stating finanicial trading consists of „games with
memory“ and not all variables can be assumed to be random.
On the other hand the formula of Black und Scholes as it relates to the lognormal dis-
tribution is globally the most frequently used formula for option pricing - now with the
blessing of the Nobel Prize of 1997. The results based on Black and Scholes formula
are called fair values. However, the reversed form is used to predict the volatility also
as well as the computing of beta-, gamma, omega, theta and rho- etc. and other indi-
cators all relate to the Black and Scholes formula (S. Doll, 1992).
The practical unlimited availability of financial data...
A new method is introduced as a new approach to validate current option pricing me-
thods. Samples contain quotations of weekly Dollar/DEM exchange rates and of DAX,
DOW as well as NASDAQ indexes during 1988 til 1997. However, any other historical
data could be used also. Since 52 future notations are required to calculate ex post theEmpirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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real exercise results as well as the real ex ante volatility values 469 weekly evaluations
are compared covering 1988 til 1996. (1997 data are used only as a forecast stack ex
post.)
Distributions cannot be log-normally distributed whenever their net yield exceeds the
more appropriate log-normal distributions, as applies with important indices and their
values. Otherwise Volatilityswerte would have to be subordinated, which would result in
unrealistic exchange rate fluctuations. "horizontal" course movements can be conside-
red only with an interest of r = 0%.
F.  II.  Distributions and Excess Returns
GARCH-beginnings
15 try the returns and other characteristics of a quotation in one for
these typical to divide fixed value and into a residual value with the intention that the
residues can be better described then with the normal distribution or at least with a
simpler distribution. The following representation, for which with the DAX the perfor-
mance of many years was out-counted of approximately 12%, shows this effect. The
residues are then nearly symmetrically distributed around the 0%-Linie. Only 5 per
cent, out-counted - thus a value around the interest charges without risk - arises still no
satisfying symmetry. In the place -5% even an unevenness is strengthened by consi-
dering the residuals. The curtosis is remaining pronounced too strongly for a normal
distribution.
For prognosis considerations the following objection is to be attached: The returns of
the last 16 years vary strongly from -30 to +60 per cent. Only sliding averages over 8
years oscillate weakly around the average total net yield:
That is for prognoses over
short distances a too long
period. That is called a con-
stant, which is introduced, in
order to harmonize a deter-
mined distribution by allocati-
on in "basic returns" and
"overreturns", is even one
most "volatile" variable.
If this effect is reduced by the
fact that the smaller interest rate for creation without risk is selected, the harmonizati-
on effect falls more weakly out (white curve). The actual goal of finding about a Basic
Law moderateness like the normal distribution with the residues is not achieved.
Which sense is a regularity of a several times derived size (if it would exist) to have
retroactively for the Underlying? Already the quotation is an abstraction through means
                                Figure 22: Excess Returns beyond 5 or 12 %Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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between supplies and demand demands and rounding on decimal places or fractions.
Average value, standard deviation and returns are a further derivative. Volatility as
standard deviation log arithmierten returns again a derivative of higher degree of etc..
Another idea, sign bias effects 
16 (stronger volatility changes with course decreases)
approximately for a prognosis in the model to consider, was to be determined not con-
stantly: The effect can even change with strong course movements (examines with the
dollar)
Excursion: The railway ticket view.
It’s like a railway ticket. Assuming tickets are sold always for the full distance a train is
driving. When one enters the train later he might get a deduction for the mileage not
used. If one leaves the train before the final target he gets again another deduction for
the mileage unused.
A test FV (full distance) should be FV (stage 1) + FV (stage 2) if  d = s1 + s2
The impact of time length on the B-S model is higher than it is on the present value.
F.  III.  Mispricing
There is only one overall tendency: The estimation error is increasing with the time to
maturity.
When options are deeper in the money or when volatility figures are applied higher the
real volatiliy ex post effects of misevalaution depend on the stochastic characteristics
of the underlying.
Considering 26 week time to maturity the B-S-formular is under-evaluating calls (< -
20%) and under-evaluating puts (> + 40%). This is again using the real ex post volati-
lity. Assuming the estimated and published so called implied volatility figures are often
higher (see DAX comments.)
Thus increasing the real volatilitiy by the factor 1,25 the effect is changing to > + 40%
for calls and < - 20% for puts. (see table 1 containing correspondent pairs of deviation
figures for 13 and 26 weeks.
Out-of-the-money
The individual evaluation differences made of table 2 - false evaluations, if one accepts
the suggested method - from +20 to -60 per cent with the DAX are substantial. (the
designation "fair value" for the results after Black and Scholes is rather euphemi-
stisch). The deviations seem to follow also no systematics.
a)  The hypothesis (Steinbrenner
17 1996 a. o.) in the reversal that the implicit Volatility,
counted on prices "at the money", which smallest distortion exhibits (Smile effect),Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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is not proven with fictitious and actual options. (see in addition also section „Actual
Volatility DAX vs VDAX“)
The original smile effect relates to implied volatility (G. Murphy 1994, O. Pilz
1994.Volatility values show a minimum, a „smile“ [☺], when computed based on pri-
ces of calls „at-the-money“.
b)  With running times up tol 130 weeks it can be shown that the underestimation
settles down with "fair values" for DAX calls (hit 75 from 100) on -30 per cent. Ove-
restimation with DAX puts increases. With dollar calls against it overestimation
Figure 23: Smile Effects
While the original smile effect means a minimun „at-the-money“ (1,49/1,52) minima
can be observerd around 1,55.
Instead of the implicit volatility values computed by the reverse Black und Scholes
formula the actual volatility ex post was 7,1% - 7,2%.
The actual volatility of the DAX index ex post was 7,1% - 7,2%. end of July 1996 and
22% mid of January 1998, i.e. the implicit volatility is higher significantly
An explanation may be another observation: In case of the DAX the error of Black und
Scholes is minimal around position 0% showing some kind of „smile“ [☺]
The fact that the Black and Scholes evaluation is equal to the exercising result around
position 9% (13%) for options with time to maturity of 13 (26) weeks seems rather ar-
bitrary.  and
However for the Dollar exchange rate there is a maximum indicating for situations „at
the money“ and a rather gloomy [ ] situation.
The Black and Scholes evaluation is equal to the exercising result  around position
10% only for options with time to maturity of 13 weeks seems also arbitrary.
In both cases options hight „out-of-the-money“ deviations reach extremeous per cen-Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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constantly increases, lasts themselves the underestimation with -50 per cent settles
down starting from running times of 26 weeks.
c)  A cause for the substantial evaluation errors lies primarily in the fact that the actual
return distributions of the accepted, theoretical distributions of the models deviate.
d)  With the formula after Black and Scholes it is added that this accepts the future,
subordinated course in fact as around the base value strewing. The empirical expe-
rience, which is observed and divided also by many authors, shows however that
courses strew rather around the last value, "best predictor". It explains that usually
the false evaluation for options precipitates "from the money" most highly (excepti-
on DOW, see Figure 7).
e)  From the right-inclined of the subordinated log-normal distribution resulting tenden-
tious overestimation of calls is not sufficient for compensation: At the indices the
net yield of many years the right-inclined of the log-normal distribution exceeds and
leads DAX, DOW and NASDAQ therefore also to underestimations of calls
18.
f)   Artificially produced indices with lognormaler(!) Over 10 years (an example over 1
year) are subject to distribution - unexpectedly - to a false evaluation. The errors
are with log-normal Dollar"courses (DAX") between +7 and -85 per cent (-13 to -
53%). puts are appropriate here on the average for a stronger underevaluations in
addition also that.
g)  A contradiction
19  with the application of the formula after Black and Scholes con-
sists of the fact that the model assumes homoscedasticity, i.e. constant variance
over the remaining time of an option which cannot be observed in reality. (see be-
low in addition also the section for the "Nature of Volatility“). There are course for-
mats and thus variance and volatility formats favouring calls or puts.
One could object that the predominant underestimation with calls after Black and
Scholes is not a disadvantage. It is pointed out by different authors that at fair values
with addition of the transaction costs and taxes no profits are to be obtained "above
normally".Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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“ examination at noted options (DAX, USD, SRF)" show that the "fair values" seem to
have quite a coining effect.
Man könnte einwenden, daß die überwiegende Unterbewertung bei Calls nach Black
und Scholes kein Nachteil sei
20. Von verschiedenen Autoren
21 wird darauf hingewie-
sen, daß bei Fairen Werten mit Hinzurechnung der Transaktionskosten und Steuern
keine Gewinne „above normal“ zu erzielen seien. Die Beispiele im Abschnitt „zeigen,
daß die „Fairen Werte“ durchaus eine prägende Wirkung zu haben scheinen.
Since the Brownian Motion has metaphorical meaning for courses only and the log-
normal distribution subordinated thereby is not to be proven, the proper price evaluati-
on still waits with the financial markets for a rational explanation. The following section
examines in addition a fundamental objection whether the "fair values" represent at all
the actual process of the proceeds curves.
F.  IV.   Improved results by reducing Volatility
For a fit calls (puts) the real volatility ex post should be multiplied by 0,58 (1,55) to re-
trieve equal evaluations according to the B-S-Model compared with results when exer-
cised.
Considering 26 week time to maturity the B-S-formular is over-evaluating calls (> +
30%) and under-evaluating puts (< - 40%). This is using the real ex post volatility. As-
suming the estimated and published so called implied volatility figures are often higher
(see DAX comments.) Thus increasing the real volatilitiy by the factor 1,25 the effect is
changing to > + 40% for calls and < - 20% for puts. (see table 1 containing correspon-
dent pairs of deviation figures for 13 and 26 weeks.
For the Dollar/DEM exchange rate calls „in-the-money“ the B-S-formular is over-
evaluating calls (+ 30%) and under-evaluating corresponding puts (< - 55%). This is
using the real ex post volatility. Assuming the estimated and published so called im-
plied volatility figures are often higher (see DAX comments.) Thus increasing the real
volatilitiy by the factor 1,25 the effect is changing to > 40% for calls and < - 20% for
puts.
F.  V.  Law of Great Numbers
In  „Figure 5: Fictitious Options - Dollar“ it becomes clearly like the expectations of pro-
fit with options - equal only over a long time, here 10 years, form - directly to the ap-
propriate illustration to the DAX whether one pushes away to the average value of
proceeds or the "fair value". (months-long phases of calls or puts without practice
proceeds do not exclude short term profits with the daily trade with actual options and
during in reciprocal effect with the Volatility developing market prices.)Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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The statistical contribution to this problem is the "law of the large number": "with suffi-
cient large extent n of the observation series the relative frequency becomes only rare
deviating from her corresponding the probability (...) by more than a given, arbitrarily
small amount." (Anderson, 1957) for prognoses thereby an additional, problematic ac-
ceptance must be always added: The future values, which were not with the statement
of the collective characteristics of the examined observation series involved, depend
nevertheless on the same (or subordinated) valid distribution etc.
Black and Scholes stated: „we assumed.., that over a finite time interval the returns
on a common stock are lognormally distributed
22“. To describe a discret log-normal
Distribution realisticly, about 40 classes and 100 Cases
23 are required. A distributionn
can be represented only when more than 100 times (weeks, days etc) Options funis-
hed similarely will be bought. Or differently said: A distribution, accepted for n times -
thus for a temporal profile - cannot be applied to the temporal cross section.
Emitters can in such a way determine with distributions over years the risks of emissi-
on strategies, but not punctual investors. Whereby a strategy lies correctly only if the
results approach on the average increasingly the forecast. The picture, a "fair value"
can be attached as it were as value proof of an individual option, is not to be justified
statistically according to this model.
The Brownian Motion has influenced the theory of financial markets
24. In diesem kine-
tischem Modell werden Erwartungswerte für Millionen von sich gleichzeitig bewegen-
den Moleküle (die bei gegebener Temperatur einen bestimmten Druck bilden) be-
stimmt. Die Übertragung auf die Preisbildung des Marktes fällt im Detail schwer. Da
vor allem die lognormale Verteilung nicht zutrifft, wird in aktuellen Ansätzen
25 versucht,
durch zusätzliche Modellbedingungen (Filterregeln, Handelsregeln wie der „Bid-Ask
Spread“ und Bedingungen für Exzeßvolatility) Asymmetrien, Leptokurtose der Rendi-
ten etc., „Marktanomalien“ abzubilden.
Ein anderer Gedanke liegt in der Frage, ob die Optionen (noch) Derivate sind oder ob
ihre Preisentwicklung und ihr Handelsvolumen nicht eher den Kurs des Underlying be-
einflussen. Kolb
26 wirft diesen Gedanken mit der These mit der (Eintages-) „Lead-
Lag“-Relationship auf. Vermutet wird dieses Phänomen besonders vor dem Verfalls-
termin. Es werden Modelle diskutiert, die umgekehrt aus der Optionspreisentwicklung
Gesetzmäßigkeiten für das Underlying ableiten (Rady
27, 1995).
F.  VI.   Nature of Volatility
In  „Figure 5: Fictitious Options - Dollar“ it was shown that the actual volatility does not
have an indicator function for option chances. It can be shown also with the artificially
produced log-normal courses, against the acceptance of different models not constant
for the duration of short option running times. It is said, that both sides in an option saleEmpirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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agree on the level of the future voaltility. However this is wrong. They may see a price
they didn't expect instead
28.
The examples in chapter D.  III. Examinations at quoted Options (DAX, USD, SRF)
show that "fair values" continue to remove with high volatility (ex post) from the actual
prices. Similarly work the superelevated VDAX values also, which however reduce the
false evaluation with calls (puts) according to Black and Scholes with the DAX some-
thing (increase). A reason for the interest in the volatility variable consists of simplifying
the task of prognosis for the underlying on one central parameter. In practice is rek-
koned back with actual daily changing option prices, so-called implicit volatility under
reversal of the formula by Black and Scholes or - more correctly - "estimated" again. It
is statistically doubtful, that these daily values are taken as prognosis for annual values
and nevertheless are assumed - model-conformal - as constant for the remaining run-
ning time. Implicit Volatility can induce unreal market tendencies in the change with
superelevated prices. The actual Volatility includes against it by definition an avera-
ging, with individual values the only weak influence on the average for several days or
weeks.
The systematic question reads whether price tendencies essentially from that the sy-
stematic question reads itself, whether preistendenzen can be essentially justified from
the Volatility. In the evaluation comparison actual like artificially produced courses on
the chances of options in preceded the sections it could be shown that the Volatility is
not the only regulation factor: (in chapter "Empirical Results part 1") about shows that
increased Volatilityswerte does not affect coining/shaping actual proceeds. With cour-
se movements similar to a shaft about also the relation between wavelength and run-
ning time is relevant. Also the standardized "Comparison: Underlying vs option Chan-
ces "shows that the value does not depend on after proceeds - at least not exclusive -
the volatility. The systematic question reads of whether price tendencies can essen-
tially be justified from the volatility. Into the evaluation comparison actual like artificially
produced courses on the chances of options into preceded the sections it could shown
that the volatility is emergency the only regularization factor: Figure 11: SFR option,
Strike 1.23 (in chapter "Empirical Results part 1") about shows that increased volatility
levels does ######## emergency affect coining/shaping actual proceeds. With course
movements similar tons of A shaft about thus the relation between wavelength and
running time is relevantly. Thus the standardized "Comparison: Underlying vs option
Chances "shows that the VALUE of does emergency depend on after proceeds - RK
leases emergency exclusive - the Volatility The meaning (implicit) of the volatility as A
cent ral of parameter (the prognosis of the volatility is a branch of research for itself!) is
on difficult this background tons explain. It is as implicit Volatility from current market
prices if necessary at indicator for the option prices, which may indicate "heating" orEmpirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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"cooling". The tendency of the market, which with A separate evaluation and weighting
can be determined according to call and put of prices, hardly finds interest.
F.  VII.   Discontinuity of Autocorrelation
The phenomenon of the correlation with financial data rows among themselves and in
particular the phenomenon of the autocorrelation forms the basis (auto -) of the involu-
tion models - "own data history" for prognoses is used, how others (Hindler, 1983) to
say. In addition, the statement of strongly varying autocorrelation levels is not new.
Dourat et al. (1996) refer even to intra day analyses ("notoriously unstable") to it. Auto-
correlation at financial values, also the often subordinated "stramme" correlation bet-
ween DAX, DOW and dollar is subject to strong dynamics (of r 0.95 to r.
The representation of the phenomenon for longer periods and in particular the realiza-
tion that the autocorrelation level changes practically between two conditions, "white
noise" and autocorrelation on high level, is interesting both for the supply of ideal Test-
samples for the experimental research and for the prognosis models. Autocorrelation
with coincidence-generated log-normal courses (without illustration) precipitates sub-
stantially smaller than for instance with the DAX, although those is strongly reduced
form variety with only 25 different net yield values. The causes for autocorrelation are a
field for further investigations. Also, why the effect precipitates with the DOW relatively
small (until 40 repetitions), with the DAX is more strongly pronounced (until 60) and
with the NASDAQ twice as strongly precipitates - both with weekly like daily quotations.
To ask it would be whether there is a factor bundle that autocorrelation or evenly ne-
vertheless (strangely -) correlation to exogenous factors provokes. Two theses are of-
fered for it:
1. Autocorrelation is here an illusory effect. Autocorrelation - approximately over one
year - does not mean actual connection of the current courses with the old courses as
for instance in the population statistics between marriage ceremonies and births. Rat-
her a course (and the market participants interested in it) behaves to similar external
impulses, the current market draws homogeneously from the "repertoire" of historical
market reactions.
2. An index like the DOW is in its reaction to impulses more dominanter, more inde-
pendently, than for instance the DAX. A beginning for the analysis could consist of
looking for comparable conditions for frequently arising profiles
F.  VIII.   Discontinuity and Predicting
For prognoses the interesting beginning results to reproach separate strategies, "regi-
me Switching Models", for different status forms (defined like here as correlation
levels) from the diskontinuitaet. For the quality of prognoses on the basis of autore-
gressiver beginnings as for instance with the GARCH models, is to be asked however,Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
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how this dynamics for prognoses can be considered satisfyingly. This information can-
not be derived from the "own" past. Approximately 17-fache repetitions arose within a
yearly or only after two years. This question cannot be eliminated with "out of sample"
tests also.
Simplified expressed, is the characteristic of a value forms in times of high autocorre-
lation out. Their duration amounts to on average 5 weeks, with peak values only 3
weeks. The change between the different phases runs abruptly and without reco-
gnizable advance of course formations, which one could use as "triggers" for "if then"-
prognoses. Formats, which repeat themselves particularly frequently, could thereupon
to be examined, to what extent they run with other course sequences or exogenous
factors synchronously.
Summary
By analyzing fictitious options significant mispricing due to the formula of Black and
Scholes can be shown systematically and independent from market distortion. Without
any evidence of lognormal distributions in reality even options based on fictitious and
lognormally distributed courses are not valued properly.
According to the Law of Large Numbers pricing models based on time distibutions
should be applied to strategies rather than to single option trading.
The discontinuity of autocorrelation has impact on forecasting models. The future will
belong to those models able to include exogene factors like relevant information and
changes of the economic scenario. Promising aproaches that could cope with these
influences are „if then“-predictions, regime switching models, neuronal and „learning“
approaches. The current impact of volatility on option pricing is not justified.
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1 In case of section difficult to understand I am prepared to "retry" and would appriciate any syggestion.
2 In the department „civil ("bürgerliche") mathematics“ (This term includes simple as well as applied
mathematics and mathematics for economical science) of the Flensburg joined university library the
term volatiliy doesn't exist. The classical statstistic doesn't know the term „Volatility“ (or „Vola“ as the
banking personell say). Typical characteristic are the standard deviation σ (sigma) or the variance with
t σ2 respectively. Generally with
σ2 = 1/n   (Xi-∅(X))  (for i = 1 til N)
defined. In option pricing formulas this form is used also:
σ“2 = 1/n   [ln(Xi/ Xi-1)-µ]  (for i = 1 til N)
3 See also: Schroeder, G., Stochastic Pricing, 2005
4 The  Clustering rule should be seen complementary to the Mean Reversion rule since once the vola-
tile returns are consumed Clustering results in an smoothing effect also.
5 The Brownian Motion is well described along with the model of B&S. However the details of stock
exchange procedures and OTC are not covered. An exemption is Aït-Sahalia (1998).
6 The Brownian Motion is three dimensional. Considering the room between the preparation glasses as
a plane it is two dimensional.
7 NASDAQ’s trading system Opti-Mark allows to split large orders into different volumes at different
prices to make them less visible. (FAZ, 1.10.1999, P. 25)
8 Following Hull (1997) a / the standard textbook for option pricing.
9 Nach der Formel: Vyear = V13 *  52/13 = 2  * V13 weeks. Die Umrechnung auf die Laufzeit findet in der
Bewertungsformel statt.
10 Das Underlying (S) geht mit in die Formel von Black und Scholes ein:
Mit C





= Value of the call option
= Spot
= Standard deviation, volatility




(reg.  „d“ see note 18.)
SN (d) is interpreted as expected value Under
lying, the second expression is interpreted as the
expected costs of the option exercised at matu-
rity, leaving the difference of both expressions as
the option price.
11 The values could also the centers of the sections (with 13 Weeks i.e. the 7th week etc..) are added.
If the found values are analyzed, an appropriate lag should be granted...
12 Curtosis (when leptocurtic, slim, exaggerates or as platykurtisch, flat) and inclined ones (skewness)
are statistic terms, with which these observations are generally described, with those in addition, im-Empirical Contributions to Option Pricing
Page  34
                                                                                                                                                                     
plies hope along, it are still correct but defective forms of the Gaussian curve, leaving the hypothesis of
normaldistributed returns valid still.
13 Options of Citibank N.A., New York, Branch Frankfurt/Main :
WKN Typ Strike from: due: WKN Typ Strike from: due:
SFR/DE
M
815543 CA 1,23 9/95 3/98 Dollar/DM 815277 CA 1,50 3/96 9/96
SFR/DE
M
815544 PU 1,23 9/95 3/98 Dollar/DM 815278 PU 1,50 3/96 9/96
DAX 815506 CA 2500 3/96 12/96 Dollar/DM 818434 CA 1,80 3/97 3/98
DAX 815507 PU 2500 3/96 12/96 Dollar/DM 818435 PU 1,80 3/97 3/98
        These options are subject of German law.
14 ODE / PDE:  Abbreviation for ordinary (gewöhnliche) / partial (partielle) differential equations.
15 Zu einem Vorschlag aus einer unveröffentlichten Manuskript (1997), das von der ZfB zu Verfügung
gestellt wurde.
16 Following Engle/Ed. (1993) Der Hinweis darauf stammt aus der gleichen Arbeit (Anm. 15). Zur
Überprüfung wurde hier der Dollarwechselkurs 1988 bis 1997 analysiert..
17 The ideal type format of the Smile-Effects is described in Steinbrenner (1996) P. 291
18
The Variable „d“ in the B-S formula has with „L“ the strike
price in the denominator (and not the actual spot t Sn!).
19 The idea leading to this point was suggested by the referee. An extensive discussion of this dieser
model  deviation can be found already in Galai (in Brenner 1983), Pages. 65-68.
20 Galai (1983, in M. Brenner, 19983) P. 46, sees herein a sign of market efficiency , that market prices
equal with the sum out of (undervalued) „Fair Values“ including transaction costs (and taxes).  Thus a
buy at fair value would not allow margins „above-normal“.
21 Galai S. 46 (in Brenner 1983)
22 Reg. the assumption of the lognormal Distribution see: Black/Scholes (1972) S. 400
23 According the Chi-square test, requiring a minimum of 5 cases per classification, even 5 x 40 = i.e.
more than 200 cases would be required.
24 According to an Internet-Research 1998 intstitutes like the LSE Finanancial Markets Group (see
Rady 1995), the Freiburger Zentrum der für Datenanalys und Modellbildung, the Institut für numerische
und angewandte Mathematik, Göttingen, the Institut für medizinische Statistik in Berlin (FU), as well as
typically the Applied Mathematics / Statistics faculties of the Universities in Cambridge, Harvard, Kon-
stanz, Leiden, Paris (IV), Siegen, Sydney, and Warschau are researchin in Marcovian and Martingale-
Processes, Brownian Motion (or more general Wiener Processes) in relation to market modelling.
25 Aït-Sahalia (1998) Pages 94f. and 119f
26 Reg. the Hypothesis „Lead-Lag-Relationship“ see Kolb (1996) P. 185
27 Rady (1995), Pages. 1 and 11
28 The wrong position is quoted from Beike/Schulz (1996) P. 629f.